Review of accounting studies,2003,16(8):531-560 Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage and How It Informs AboutProtability and Price-to-Book RatiosDoron Nissim, Stephen. PenmanAbstract
This paper presents a ?nancial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage that arises in ?nancing activities from leveragethat arises in operations. The analysis yields two leveraging equations, one for borrowing to ?nance operations and one forborrowing in the course of operations. These leveraging equations describe how the two types of leverage affect book rates ofreturn on equity. An empirical analysis shows that the ?nancial statement analysis explains cross-sectional differences incurrent and future rates of return as well as price-to-book ratios, which are based on expected rates of return on equity. Thepaper therefore concludes that balance sheet line items for operating liabilities are priced differently than those dealing with ?nancing liabilities. Accordingly, ?nancial statement analysis that distinguis hes the two types of liabilities informs on futurepro?tability and aids in the evaluation of appropriate price-to-book ratios.
Keywords: financing leverage; operating liability leverage; rate of return on equity; price-to-book ratio
Leverage is traditiona lly viewed as arising from ?nancing activities: Firms borrow to raise cash for operations. This papershows that, for the purposes of analyzing pro?tability and valuing ?rms, two types of leverage are relevant, one indeed arisingfrom ?nancing activities b ut another from operating activities. The paper supplies a ?nancial statement analysis of the twotypes of leverage
that explains differences in shareholder pro?tability and price-to-book ratios.
The standard measure of leverage is total liabilities to equity. However, while some liabilities—like bank loans and bondsissued—are due to ?nancing, other liabilities—like trade payables, deferred revenues, and pension liabilities—result fromtransactions with suppliers, customers and employees in conducting operations. Financing liabilities are typically traded inwell-functioning capital markets where issuers are price takers. In contrast, ?rms are able to add value in operations becauseoperations involve trading in input and output markets that are less perfect than capital markets. So, with equity valuation inmind, there are a priori reasons for viewing operating liabilities differently from liabilities that arise in ?nancing.
Our research asks whether a dollar of operating liabilities on the balance sheet is priced differently from a dollar of ?nancingliabilities. As operating and ?nancing liabilities are components of the book value of equity, the question is equivalent toasking whether price-to-book ratios depend on the composition of book values. The price-to-book ratio is determined by theexpected rate of return on the book value so, if components of book value command different price premiums, they must implydifferent expected rates of return on book value. Accordingly, the paper also investigates whether the two types of liabilitiesare associated with differences in future book rates of return.
Standard ?nancial statement analysis distinguishes shareholder pro?tability that arises from operations from that which arisesfrom borrowing to ?nance opera tions. So, return on assets is distinguished from return on equity, with the difference attributedto leverage. However, in the standard analysis, operating liabilities are not distinguished from ?nancing liabilities. Therefore,to develop the speci?cation s for the empirical analysis, the paper presents a ?nancial statement analysis that identi?es theeffects of operating and ?nancing liabilities on rates of return on book value—and
so on price-to-book ratios—with explicit leveraging equations that explain when leverage from each type of liability isfavorable or unfavorable.
The empirical results in the paper show that ?nancial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage in operations from
leverage in ?nancing also distinguishes differences in contemporaneous and future pro?tability among ?rms. Leverage fromoperating liabilities typically levers pro?tability more than ?nancing leverage and has a higher frequency of favorableeffects.Accordingly, for a given total leverage from both sources, ?rms with hig her leverage from operations have higherprice-to-book ratios, on average. Additionally, distinction between contractual and estimated operating liabilities explainsfurther differences in ?rms’ pro?tability and their price-to-book ratios.
Our results are of consequence to an analyst who wishes to forecast earnings and book rates of return to value ?rms. Thoseforecasts—and valuations derived from them—depend, we show, on the composition of liabilities. The ?nancial statementanalysis of the paper, supported by the empirical results, shows how to exploit information in the balance sheet for forecastingand valuation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the ?nancial statements analysis that identi?es the two types of leverageand lays out expres sions that tie leverage measures to pro?tability. Section 2 links leverage to equity value and price-to-book
ratios. The empirical analysis is in Section 3, with conclusions summarized in Section 4.1. Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage
The following ?nancial statement analysis separates the effects of ?nancing liabilities and operating liabilities on the pro?tability of shareholders’ equity. The analysis yields explicit leveraging equations from which the speci?cations for theempirical analysis are developed.
Shareholder pro?tability, return on common equity, is measured as
Return on common equity (ROCE) = comprehensive net income ÷common equity (1) Leverage affects both the numerator anddenominator of this pro?tability measure. Appropriate ?nancial statement analysis disentangles the effects of leverage. Theanalysis below, which elaborates on parts of Nissim and Penman (2001), begins by identifying components of the balancesheet and income statement that involve operating and ?nancing activities. The pro?tability due to each activity is thencalculated and two types of leverage are introduced to explain both operating and ?nancing pro?tability and overallshareholder pro?tability.
1.1 Distinguishing the Protability of Operations from the Protability of Financing Activities
With a focus on common equity (so that preferred equity is viewed as a ?nancial liability), the balance sheet equation can berestated as follows:
Common equity =operating assets＋financial assets－operating liabilities－Financial liabilities (2)
The distinction here between operating assets (like trade receivables, inventory and property,plant and equipment) and ?nancial assets (the deposits and marketable securities that absorb excess cash) is made in other contexts. However, on theliability side, ?nancing liabilities are also distinguished here from operating liabilities. Rather than treating all liabilities as ?nancing debt, only liabilities that raise cash for operations—like bank loans, short-term commercial paper and bonds—areclassi?ed as such. Other liabilities—such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, deferred revenue, restructuring liabilitiesand pension liabilities—arise from operations. The distinction is not as simple as current versus long-term liabilities; pensionliabilities, for example, are usually long-term, and short-term borrowing is a current liability.Rearranging terms in equation (2),
Common equity = (operating assets－operating liabilities)－(financial liabilities－financial assets)Or,
Common equity = net operating assets－net financing debt (3) This equation regroups assets and liabilities into operating andnancing activities. Net operating assets are operating assets less operating liabilities. So a rm might invest in inventories,but to the extent to which the suppliers of those inventories grant credit, the net investment in inventories is reduced. Firmspay wages, but to the extent to which the payment of wages is deferred in pension liabilities, the net investment required torun the business is reduced. Net ?nancing debt is ?nancing debt (including preferred stock) minus?nancial assets. So, a ?rmmay issue bonds to raise cash for operations but may also buy bonds with excess cash from operations. Its net indebtednessis its net position in bonds. Indeed a ?rm may be a net creditor (with more ?nancial assets than ?nancial liabilities) rather thana net debtor.
The income statement can be reformulated to distinguish income that comes from operating and ?nancing activities:Comprehensive net income = operating income－net financing expense (4) Operating income is produced in operations andnet ?nancial expense is incurred in the ?nancing of operations. Interest income on ?nancial assets is netted against interestexpense on ?nancial liabilities (including preferred dividends) in net ?nancial expense. If interest i ncome is greater thaninterest expense, ?nancing activities produce net ?nancial income rather than net ?nancial expense. Both operating incomeand net ?nancial expense (or income) are after tax.3
Equations (3) and (4) produce clean measures of after-tax o perating pro?tability and the borrowing rate:Return on net operating assets (RNOA) = operating income ÷net operating assets (5) and
Net borrowing rate (NBR) = net financing expense ÷net financing debt (6) RNOA recognizes that pro?tabilit y must be basedon the net assets invested in operations. So ?rms can increase their operating pro?tability by convincing suppliers, in thecourse of business, to grant or extend credit terms; credit reduces the investment that shareholders would otherwise have toput in the business. Correspondingly, the net borrowing rate, by excluding non-interest bearing liabilities from thedenominator, gives the appropriate borrowing rate for the ?nancing activities.
Note that RNOA differs from the more common return on assets (ROA), usually de?ned as income before after-tax interest
expense to total assets. ROA does not distinguish operating and ?nancing activities appropriately. Unlike ROA, RNOA
excludes ?nancial assets in the denominator and subtracts operating liabilities. Nissim and Penman (2001) report a medianROA for NYSE and AMEX ?rms from 1963–1999 of only 6.8%, but a median RNOA of 10.0%—much closer to what onewould expect as a return to business operations.
1.2 Financial Leverage and its Effect on Shareholder Protability
From expressions (3) through (6), it is straightforward to demonstrate that ROCE is a weighted average of RNOA and the netborrowing rate, with weights derived from equation (3): ROCE= [net operating assets ÷common equity× RNOA]－[net financing debt÷
common equity ×net borrowing rate (7) Additional algebra leads to the following leveraging equation:
ROCE = RNOA＋[FLEV× ( RNOA－net borrowing rate )] (8) where FLEV, the measure of leverage from ?nancing activities, isFinancing leverage (FLEV) =net financing debt ÷common equity (9) The FLEV measure excludes operating liabilities butincludes (as a net against ?nancing debt) ?nancial assets. If ?nancial assets are greater than ?nancial liabilities, FLEV isnegative. The leveraging equation (8) works for negative FLEV (in which case the net borrowing rate is the return on net ?nancial assets).
This analysis breaks shareholder pro?tability, ROCE, down into that which i s due to operations and that which is due to ?nancing. Financial leverage levers the ROCE over RNOA, with the leverage effect determined by the amount of ?nancialleverage (FLEV) and the spread between RNOA and the borrowing rate. The spread can be positive (favorable) or negative(unfavorable). 1.3 Operating Liability Leverage and its Effect on Operating Protability
While ?nancing debt levers ROCE, operating liabilities lever the pro?tability of operations, RNOA. RNOA is operating incomerelative to net operating assets, and net operating assets are operating assets minus operating liabilities. So, the more
operating liabilities a ?rm has relative to operating assets, the higher its RNOA, assuming no effect on operating income in thenumerator. The intensity of the use of operating liabilities in the investment base is operating liability leverage: Operatingliability leverage (OLLEV) =operating liabilities ÷net operating assets (10) Using operating liabilities to lever the rate of returnfrom operations may not come for free, however; there may be a numerator effect on operating income. Suppliers providewhat nominally may be interest-free credit, but presumably charge for that credit with higher prices for the goods and servicessupplied. This is the reason why operating liabilities are inextricably a part of operations
rather than the ?nancing of operations. The amount that suppliers actually charge for this credit is dif?cult to identify. But themarket borrowing rate is observable. The amount that suppliers would implicitly charge in prices for the credit at thisborrowing rate can be estimated as a benchmark: Market interest on operating liabilities= operating liabilities×marketborrowing rate
where the market borrowing rate, given that most credit is short term, can be approximated by the after-tax short-term
borrowing rate. This implicit cost is benchmark, for it is the cost that makes suppliers indifferent in supplying cred suppliers arefully compensated if they charge implicit interest at the cost borrowing to supply the credit. Or, alternatively, the ?rm buying thegoods o r services is indifferent between trade credit and ?nancing purchases at the borrowin rate.To analyze the effect of operating liability leverage on operating pro?tability, w e d e?ne:
Return on operating assets (ROOA) =(operating income＋market interest on operating liabilities)÷operating assets(11)
The numerator of ROOA adjusts operating income for the full implicit cost of trad credit. If suppliers fully charge the implicitcost of credit, ROOA is the return of operating assets that would be earned had the ?rm no operating liability leverage.
suppliers do not fully charge for the credit, ROOA measures the return fro operations that includes the favorable implicit creditterms from suppliers.
Similar to the leveraging equation (8) for ROCE, RNOA can be expressed as:
RNOA = ROOA＋[ OLLEV ×(ROOA－market borrowing rate )] (12) where the borrowing rate is the after-tax short-term interestrate.Given ROOA, the effect of
leverage on pro?tability is determined by the level of operating liability leverage and the spread between ROOA and theshort-term after-tax interest rate. Like ?nancing l everage, the effect can be favorable or unfavorable: Firms can reduce theiroperating pro?tability through operating liability leverage if their ROOA is less than the market borrowing rate. However,ROOA will also be affected if the implicit borrowing cost on operating liabilities is different from the market borrowing rate.1.4 Total Leverage and its Effect on Shareholder Protability
Operating liabilities and net ?nancing debt combine into a total leverage measure:Total leverage (TLEV) = ( net financing debt＋operating liabilities)÷common equityThe borrowing rate for total liabilities is:
Total borrowing rate = (net financing expense＋market interest on operating liabilities) ÷net financing debt＋operating liabilities
ROCE equals the weighted average of ROOA and the total borrowing rate, where the weights are proportional to the amountof total operating assets and the sum of net ?nancing debt and operating liabilities (with a negative sign), respectively. So,similar to the leveraging equations (8) and (12):
ROCE = ROOA ＋[TLEV×(ROOA －total borrowing rate)](13)
In summary, ?nancial statement analysis of operating and ?nancing activities yields three leveraging equations, (8), (12), and(13). These equations are based on ?xed accounting re lations and are therefore deterministic: They must hold for a given ?rm at a given point in time. The only requirement in identifying the sources of pro?tability appropriately is a clean separationbetween
operating and ?nancing components in the ?nancial statements.2. Leverage, Equity Value and Price-to-Book Ratios
The leverage effects above are described as effects on shareholder pro?tability. Our interest is not only in the effects onshareholder pro?tability, ROCE, but also in the effects on shareholder value, which is tied to ROCE in a straightforward wayby the residual income valuation model. As a restatement of the dividend discount model, the residual income modelexpresses the value of equity at date 0 (P0) as:
B is the book value of common shar eholders’ equity, X is comprehensive income to common shareholders, and r is therequired return for equity investment. The price premium over book value is determined by forecasting residual income, Xt –rBt-1. Residual income is determined in part by income relative to book value, that is, by the forecasted ROCE. Accordingly,leverage effects on forecasted ROCE (net of effects on the required equity return) affect equity value relative to book value:The price paid for the book value depends on the expect ed pro?tability of the book value, and leverage affects pro?tability.So our empirical analysis investigates the effect of leverage on both pro?tability and price-to-book ratios. Or, stated differently,nancing and operating liabilities are distinguishable components of book value, so the question is whether the pricing ofbook values depends on the composition of book values. If this is the case, the different components of book value must implydifferent pro?tability. Indeed, the two analyses (of pro?tab ility and price-to-book ratios) are complementary.Financing liabilities are contractual obligations for repayment of funds loaned. Operating
liabilities include contractual obligations (such as accounts payable), but also include accrual liabilities (such as deferredrevenues and accrued expenses). Accrual liabilities may be based on contractual terms, but typically involve estimates. Weconsider the real effects of contracting and the effects of accounting estimates in turn. Appendix A provides some examples ofcontractual and estimated liabilities and their effect on pro?tability and value.2.1 Effects of Contractual liabilities
The ex post effects of ?nancing and operating liabilities on pro?tability are clear from leveraging equations (8), (12) and (13).These expressions always hold ex post, so there is no issue regarding ex post effects. But valuation concerns ex ante effects.The extensive research on the effects of ?nancial leverage takes, as its point of departure, the Modigliani and Miller (M&M)(1958) ?nancing irrelevance proposition: With perfect capital markets and no taxes or information asymmetry, debt ?nancinghas no effect on value. In terms of the residual income valuation model, an increase in ?nancial leverage due to a substitutionof debt for equity may increase expected ROCE according to expression (8), but that increase is offset in the valuation (14) bythe reduction in the book value of equity that earns the excess pro?tability and the increase in the required equity return,
leaving total value (i.e., the value of equity and debt) unaffected. The required equity return increases because of increased ?nancing risk: Leverage may be expected to be favorable but, the higher the leverage, the greater the loss to shareholdersshould the leverage turn unfavorable ex post, with RNOA less than the borrowing rate.
In the face of the M&M proposition, research on the value effects of ?nancial leverage has proceeded to relax the conditionsfor the proposition to hold. Modigliani and Miller (1963) hyp othesized that the tax bene?ts of debt increase after-tax returns toequity and so increase equity
value. Recent empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis (e.g., Kemsley and Nissim, 2002), although the issueremains controversial. In any case, since the implicit cost of operating liabilities, like interest on ?nancing debt, is taxdeductible, the composition of leverage should have no tax implications.
Debt has been depicted in many studies as affecting value by reducing transaction and contracting costs. While debtincreases expected bankruptcy costs and introduces agency costs between shareholders and debtholders, it reduces thecosts that shareholders must bear in monitoring management, and may have lower issuing costs relative to equity. One mightexpect these considerations to apply to operating debt as well as ?nancing debt, with the effects differing only by degree.Indeed papers have explained the use of trade debt rather than ?nancing debt by transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), differentia laccess of suppliers and buyers to ?nancing (Schwartz,1974), and informational advantages and comparative costs of
monitoring (Smith, 1987; Mian and Smith, 1992; Biais and Gollier, 1997). Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide some tests ofthese explanations.
In addition to tax, transaction costs and agency costs explanations for leverage, research has also conjectured an
informational role. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) characterized ?nancing choice as a signal of pro?tability andvalue, and subseque nt papers (for example, Myers and Majluf, 1984) have carried the idea further. Other studies haveascribed an informational role also for operating liabilities. Biais and Gollier (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (1997), forexample, see suppliers as having mo re information about ?rms than banks and the bond market, so more operating debtmight indicate higher value. Alternatively, high trade payables might indicate dif?culti es in paying suppliers and decliningfortunes.
Additional insights come from further relaxing the perfect frictionless capital markets assumptions underlying the original M&Mnancing irrelevance proposition. When it comes to operations, the product and input markets in which rms trade are
typically less competitive than capital markets. In deed, ?rms are viewed as adding value primarily in operations rather than innancing activities because of less than purely competitive product and input markets. So, whereas it is difficult to ‘‘makemoney off the debtholders,’’ ?rms can be seen as ‘‘mak ing money off the trade creditors.’’ In operations, ?rms can exertmonopsony power, extracting value from suppliers and employees. Suppliers may provide cheap implicit ?nancing in
exchange for information about products and markets in which the ?rm operates. They may also bene?t from ef?ciencies inthe ?rm’s supply and distribution chain, and may grant credit to capture future business.2.2 Effects of Accrual Accounting Estimates
Accrual liabilities may be based on contractual terms, but typically involve estimates. Pension liabilities, for example, arebased on employment contracts but involve actuarial estimates. Deferred revenues may involve obligations to service
customers, but also involve estimates that allocate revenues to periods. While contractual liabilities are typically carried onthe balance sheet as an unbiased indication of the cash to be paid, accrual accounting estimates are not necessarily
unbiased. Conservative accounting, for example, might overstate pension liabilities or defer more revenue than required bycontracts with customers.
Such biases presumably do not affect value, but they affect accounting rates of return and the pricing of the liabilities relativeto their carrying value (the price-to-book ratio). The effect of accounting estimates on operating liability leverage is clear:Higher carrying values for operating
liabilities result in higher leverage for a given level of operating assets. But the effect on pro?tability is also clear from
leveraging equation (12): While conservative accounting for operating assets increases the ROOA, as modeled in Felthamand Ohlson (1995) and Zhang (2000), higher book values of operating liabilities lever up RNOA over ROOA. Indeed,
conservative accounting for operating liabilities amounts to leverage of book rates of return. By leveraging equation (13), thatleverage effect ?ows through to shareholder pro?tability, ROCE.And higher anticipated ROCE implies a higher price-to-book ratio.
The potential bias in estimated operating liabilities has opposite effects on current and future pro?tability. For example, if a ?rm books higher deferred revenues, accrued expenses or other operating liabilities, and so increases its operating liabilityleverage, it reduces its current pro?tability: Current revenues must be lower or expenses higher. And, if a ?rm reports loweroperating assets (by a write down of receivables, inventories or other assets, for example), and so increases operating liabilityleverage, it also reduces current pro?tability: Current expense s must be higher. But this application of accrual accountingaffects future operating income: All else constant, lower current income implies higher future income. Moreover, higher
operating liabilities and lower operating assets amount to lower book value of equity. The lower book value is the base for therate of return for the higher future income. So the analysis of operating liabilities potentially identi?es part of the accrual
reversal phenomenon documented by Sloan (1996) and interprets it as affecting leverage, forecasts of pro?tability, and price-to-book ratios.
3. Empirical Analysis
The analysis covers all ?rm-year observations on the combined COMPUSTAT (Industry and Research) ?les for any of the 39years from 1963 to 2001 that satisfy the following requirements: (1)
the company was listed on the NYSE or AMEX; (2) the company was not a ?nancial institution (SIC codes 6000–6999),
thereby omitting ?rms where most ?nancial assets and liabilities are used in operations; (3) the book value of common equityis at least $10 million in 2001 dollars; and (4) the averages of the beginning and ending balance of operating assets, netoperating assets and common equity are positive (as balance sheet variables are measured in the analysis using annualaverages). T hese criteria resulted in a sample of 63,527 ?rm-year observations.
Appendix B describes how variables used in the analysis are measured. One measurement issue that deserves discussion isthe estimation of the borrowing cost for operating liabilities. As most operating liabilities are short term, we approximate theborrowing rate by the after-tax risk-free one-year interest rate. This measure may understate the borrowing cost if the riskassociated with operating liabilities is not trivial. The effect of such measurement error is to induce a negative correlationbetween ROOA and OLLEV. As we show below, however, even with this potential negative bias we document a strongpositive relation between OLLEV and ROOA.4. Conclusion
To ?nance operations, ?rms borrow in the ?nancial markets, creating ?nancing leverage. In running their operations, ?rmsalso borrow, but from customers, employees and suppliers, creating operating liability leverage. Because they involve tradingin different types of markets, the two types of leverage may have different value implications. In particular, operating liabilitiesmay re?ect contractual terms that add value in different ways than ?nancing liabilities, and so they may be priced differently.Operating liabilities also involve accrual accounting estimates that may further affect their pricing. This study has investigatedthe implications of the two types of leverage for pro?tability and equity value.
The paper has laid out explicit leveraging equations that show how shareholder p ro?tability is related to ?nancing leverageand operating liability leverage. For operating liability leverage, the leveraging equation incorporates both real contractualeffects and accounting effects. As price-to-book ratios are based on expected pro?tab ility, this analysis also explains howprice-to-book ratios are affected by the two types of leverage. The empirical analysis in the paper demonstrates that operatingand ?nancing liabilities imply different pro?tability and are priced differently in the stock market.
Further analysis shows that operating liability leverage not only explains differences in pro?tability in the cross-section butalso informs on changes in future pro?tability from current pro?tability. Operating liability leverage and changes in operatingliability leverage are indicators of the quality of current reported pro?tability as a predictor of future pro?tability.
Our analysis distinguishes contractual operating liabilities from estimated liabilities, but further research might examine
operating liabilities in more detail, focusing on line items such as accrued expenses and deferred revenues. Further researchmight also investigate the pricing of operating liabilities under differing circumstances; for example, where ?rms have ‘‘marketpower’’ over their suppliers.会计研究综述，2003,16(8):531-560
财务报表分析的杠杆左右以及如何体现盈利性和值⽐率摘要
本⽂提供了区分⾦融活动和业务运营中杠杆作⽤的财务报表分析。这些分析得出了两个杠杆作⽤等式。⼀个⽤于⾦融业务中的借贷，⼀个⽤于运营过程的借贷。这些等式描述了两种杠杆效应如何影响股本收益率。实证分析表明，财务报表分析解释了当前和未来的回报率以及股价与账⾯价值⽐率具有代表性的差异。因此⽂章得出如下结论，资产负债表项⽬的运营负债定价不同于融资负债。因此，财务报表的分析能够区分两种类型的负债对未来盈利能⼒和提升适当的股价与账⾯价值⽐率的影响。关键词：财政杠杆；运营债务杠杆；股本回报率；值⽐率前⾔
传统观点认为，杠杆效应是从⾦融活动中产⽣的：公司通过借贷来增加运营的资⾦。本⽂表明，在分析企业盈利和价值中，有两种相关杠杆起作⽤，⼀个的确是从⾦融活动产⽣的，另⼀种是是从运营过程中产⽣的。本⽂提供了两种类型杠杆的财务分析报表来解释股东盈利能⼒和价格与账⾯⽐率的差异。
杠杆作⽤的衡量标准是负债总额与股东权益。然⽽，⼀些负债——如银⾏贷款和发⾏的债券，是由于资⾦筹措，其他⼀些负债——如贸易应付账款，预收收⼊和退休⾦负债，是由于在运营过程中与供应商的贸易，与顾客和雇佣者在结算过程中产⽣的负债。融资负债通常交易运作良好的资本市场其中的发⾏者是随⾏就市的商⼈。与此相反，在运营中公司能够实现⾼增值。因为业务涉及的是与资本市场相⽐，不太完善的贸易的输⼊和输出的市场。
因此，考虑到股票估值，运营负债和融资负债的区别的产⽣有⼀些先验的原因。我们研究在资产负债表上，运营负债中的⼀美元是否与融资中的⼀美元等值这个问题。因为运营负债和融资负债是股票价值的组成部分，这个问题就相当于问是否股价与账⾯价值⽐率是否取决于账⾯净值的组成。价格与账⾯⽐率是由预期回报率的账⾯价值决定的。所以，
如果部分的账⾯价值要求不同的溢价，他们必须显⽰出不同的账⾯价值的预期回报率。因此，本⽂还研究了是否两类负债与将来的账⾯收益率的区别有关。
标准的财务报表分析的能够区分股东从运营中和借贷的融资业务中产⽣的利润。因此，资产回报有别于股本回报率，这种差异是由于杠杆作⽤。然⽽，在标准的分析中，经营负债不区别于融资负债。因此，为了制定⽤于实证分析的规范，本⽂提出了⼀份财务报表的分析来明确运营债务和融资债务对账⾯价值回报率的影响以及价格与账⾯⽐率，利⽤⽅程精确解释各种类型的债务中的杠杆作⽤何时起到有利作⽤，何时起到不利的作⽤。
本⽂的实证结果表明，能够区分运营中的杠杆作⽤和融资中的杠杆作⽤的财务报表分析也能够区分公司当前和未来的盈利情况。运营债务与融资债务相⽐，通常能在杠杆作⽤中使企业获得更⼤的利益，并且获得有利结果的频率更⾼。因此，在运营⽅⾯杠杆更⾼的公司有更⾼的股价与账⾯价值⽐率。此外，合同和预期经营负债的区别进⼀步说明不同企业的盈利能⼒和他们的价格账⾯价值的⽐率。
我们的研究结果是⽤于愿意分析预期公司的收益和账⾯收益率。这些预测和估值依赖于负债的组成。本⽂从实证结果得出的财务报表分析⽂件显⽰，如何利⽤资产负债表中的信息进⾏预测和估价。
这篇⽂章结构如下。第⼀部分概述并指出了了能够判别两种杠杆作⽤类型，连接杠杆作⽤和盈利的财务报表分析第⼆节将杠杆作⽤，股票价值和价格与账⾯⽐率联系在⼀起。第三节中进⾏实证分析，第四节进⾏了概述与结论。⼀、杠杆作⽤的财务报表分析
以下财务报表分析将融资债务和运营债务对股东权益的影响区别开。这个分析从实证的详细分析中得出了精确的杠杆效应等式普通股产权资本收益率=综合所得÷普通股本（1）
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